Thucydides 1.23.5-6 by Heath, M.
This is a repository copy of Thucydides 1.23.5-6.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/377/
Article:
Heath, M. (1986) Thucydides 1.23.5-6. Liverpool Classical Monthly, 11. pp. 104-105. ISSN 
0309-3700 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright 
exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy 
solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The 
publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White 
Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, 
users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Liverpool Classical Monthly 11 (1986) 104-5 
© Malcolm Heath 
 
                                                
Thucydides 1.23.5-6 
MALCOLM HEATH 
As to why they broke the treaty, I have placed first an account of the a„t…ai 
...: causes or charges? Thucydides resolves the ambiguity by the addition of ... 
and diafora…; the recriminatory sense is confirmed a few lines later (a„t…ai ... 
˜katšrwn) and by the echo in 1.146 (a„t…ai ... kaˆ diaforaˆ ... ¢mfotšroij): 
note also 1.66 (a„t…ai... ™j ¢ll»louj). But charges and disagreements may also 
be causes, since they may influence a decision to go to war; and that is clearly 
Thucydides meaning here: he presents the a„t…ai kaˆ diaforaˆ as explaining 
diÒti the treaty was abrogated, ™x Ótou the war arose. 
Of course, it would be absurd to say I have given an account of the a„t…ai 
kaˆ diaforaˆ so that no one need ever enquire ™x Ótou the war arose; but in fact 
the real explanation (prÒfasij) is quite different.1 So the statement about the 
¢lhqest£th prÒfasij must qualify, not cancel, the implied explanatory role of 
the a„t…ai; they are genuine prof£seij, but not the most genuine. This accords 
well with 1.88, where oÙ tosoàton ... Óson adds a more cogent explanation 
without denying the qualified validity of the first.
2
 This means that we are not 
dealing with a contrast between real and professed (but false) prof£seij.3 On the 
contrary, even if it is true that Sparta would not have gone to war over the a„t…ai 
™j tÕ f£neron legÒmenai if they had not felt threatened, they would nevertheless 
hardly have gone to war had they not been able to persuade themselves that it was 
the Athenians who were in breach of the treaty; so the a„t…ai must have genuine 
explanatory force. 
If ¢lhqest£th implies that this is the most genuine among many genuine 
profs£eij, the antithetical ¢fanest£th presumably implies that it was also the 
least apparent among manybut still, therefore, itself in some measure apparent. 
This is borne out by Thucydides account of the discussion at Sparta, in which (as 
has often been observed) the ¢lhqest£th prÒfasij is articulated, notably by the 
Corinthians (1.68-71). Indeed, many interpreters have felt that, by comparison 
with the a„t…ai kaˆ diafora… the ¢lhqest£th prÒfasij is too much in evidence 
in Thucydides account to be called ¢fanest£th lÒgJ.4 This is a mistake, as a re-
examination of the text will show. 
The Corinthians do attempt to aggravate Spartan fear of Athens growing 
power; but do they neglect the a„t…ai kaˆ diafora…? On the contrary, they begin 
by speaking of the harm they have suffered at Athenian hands (68.2 bl£ptesqai, 
ØbrizÒmenoi) and their resentment at Spartas failure to defend them; Athenian 
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behaviour is denounced (68.3 ºd…koun; note the implications of 69.6 ™cqrîn 
¢dikhs£ntwn, 71.1 ¿n ¢dikîntai), and the only question is: how are they to 
defend themselves against Athenian ¢dik…a (69.2)? Thus they conclude with a 
appeal to Sparta to come to the aid of her allies (71.4-7).  
Even if one chooses to emphasise the allusions to the ¢lhqest£th prÒfasij 
in the Corinthian speech, however, it would be rash to assume that the speech is 
meant to be typical.
5
 Thucydides might have given it prominence precisely 
because of an untypical emphasis on the point he thought most significant. We 
must look at what he tells us about the other speeches in the narrative portion of 
his account before we draw any conclusions. The assembly is prompted by 
Corinthian complaints about Athenian violations of the treaty and about their 
¢dik…a (67.1), seconded by Aeginetan claims that the treaty had been broken 
(67.1). Sparta responds by inviting the allies to cite further instances of Athenian 
¢dik…a (67.3 e‡ tij ti ¥llo œfh ¢dike‹sqai). Various states bring charges 
(™gkl»mata); Megara, in particular, cites numerous disputes (67.4 di£fora), and 
especially the Megarian decrees, which they see as a violation of the treaty (par¦ 
t¦j spond£j; already a cause of suspicion and an œgklhma for the Corinthians, 
42.2-3).  
[105] That the ™gkl»mata constitute the main theme of the allied speeches is 
indicated also by the Athenian reply. They choose not to address themselves at 
length to the points raised in the debate; instead they defend their conduct towards 
their own allies (73.2-77) and warn the Spartans of the dangers of war (78). But 
when they do refer to the allied arguments they say nothing of the ¢lhqest£th 
prÒfasij; they speak of the ™gkl»mata (71.3, cf. 72.1) and di£fora (78.4), and 
take it for granted that these are the considerations that might move the Spartans 
to a declaration of war (78.1 ™gkl»masi peisqšntej). In the Spartan closed 
session most of the speakers argue in just those terms (79.2 tîn mān pleÒnwn ™pˆ 
tÕ aÙtÕ aƒ gnîmai œferon, ¢dike‹n te toÝj 'Aqhna…ouj ½dh kaˆ polemhtša 
enai ™n t£cei). Archidamus accepts that the issue is the harm done to the allies 
(82.1), the allied ™gkl»mata (82.5) and Athenian ¢dik…a (85.2, mentioning 
Potidea), and he does not dispute that these constitute a casus belli; he only takes 
issue with the urgent ™n t£cei, arguing that delay would give the Athenians an 
opportunity to back down, while allowing Sparta time to make the necessary 
preparations for war. 
Of the debates concludingand conclusivespeech de Ste Croix comments 
that Sthenelaidas says nothing directly about the aitiai, and in his last sentence, 
with the words, And do not allow the Athenians to become greater, returns to 
the truest explanation.
6
 In fact Sthenelaidas bases his argument for war entirely 
on Athenian ¢dik…a, on the harm that Spartas allies have suffered at Athenian 
hands and on the need to defend and avenge them: oÙdamoà ¢nte‹pon æj oÙk 
¢dikoàsi toÝj ¹metšrouj xumm£couj... ¢nt' ¢gaqîn kakoˆ gegšnhntai (86.1); 
toÝj xumm£couj, Àn swfronîmen, oÙ perioyÒmeqa ¢dikoumšnoij oÙdā 
mell»somen timwre‹n: oƒ d' oÙkšti mšllousi kakîj p£scein (86.2); 
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6
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3 
xÚmmacoi ¢gaqo…, oÞj oÙ paradotša to‹j 'Aqhna…oij ™st…n... blaptomšnouj, 
¢ll¦ timwrhtša (86.3); ¹m©j ¢dikoumšnouj... toÝj mšllontaj ¢dike‹n (86.4); 
m»te toÝj xumm£couj kataprodidîmen, ¢ll¦ xÝn to‹j qeo‹j ™p…wmen ™pˆ 
toÝj ¢dikoàntaj (86.5). To what do these expressions refer, if not to the a„t…ai 
kaˆ diafora…? When Sthenelaidas speaks of the growth of Athenian power (86.5 
m»te toÝj 'Aqhna…ouj ™©te me…zouj g…gnesqai) he is surely not urging this as a 
reason for opening hostilities (it is common ground, as we have seen, that 
Athenian ¢dik…a is a sufficient casus belli) but as a reason for opening hostilities 
at once (86.3 timwrhtša ™n t£cei, cf. 86.4). Archidamus has urged delay and 
claimed that this would make the Spartan war effort more effective; Sthenalaidas 
counters with the claim that further delay would be to Athens benefit (allowing 
her to consolidate her power) rather than to Spartas. 
Thucydides regards Spartan fears about the growth of Athenian power as the 
¢lhqest£th prÒfasij of the war. His own view, therefore, is rather different 
from the one he attributes to Sthenelaidas, for whom the a„t…ai kaˆ diafora… are 
sufficient grounds for war and the growth of Athenian power is a reason for going 
to war sooner rather than later. If any contradiction is at risk here, it is not that the 
¢lhqest£th prÒfasij is too much in evidence; it is that Thucydides account of 
the debate, and in particular the perception of Spartan opinion implied by the 
speech assigned to Sthenelaidas (cf. 1.22.1 perˆ tîn ¢eˆ parÒntwn t¦ dšonta), 
give no support to the claim that the Spartans made their decision oÙ tosoàton 
tîn xumm£cwn peisqšntej to‹j lÒgoij (1.88). This discrepancy exists, however, 
only if Thucydides is understood as claiming that the growth of Athenian power 
was a consideration which influenced the Spartan decision directly; and that is not 
his meaning. His view seems to be rather that the Spartans perception of Athens 
as a threat created a climate of opinion in which they were predisposed to see 
Athenian actions as ¢dik…a, and to react angrily to them as such. Once a 
disposition to draw certain conclusions has arisen, those conclusions may be 
drawn without any further reference to the factor which gave rise to that 
disposition in the first place. The implication of 1.88, therefore, is: the Spartans 
were persuaded by their allies arguments; butand this is the more important 
point (since it explains why they were so readily open to persuasion)they were 
also afraid of the Athenians becoming more powerful. It is the same reasoning 
that underlies Thucydides claim that the prÒfasoj of 1.23.6, though 
¢fanest£th lÒgJ, is in fact ¢lhqest£th. 
